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A he Russian October Revolution dealt a devastating blow to 
Marxism from which Marxist sociology did not begin to 
recover until recently. Stalin's "contributions" to Marxist 
theory and practice had a particularly adverse effect on the 
fate of Marxism in the West. Whatever hopes were generated 
by the de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union proved 
short-lived. By the time Soviet tanks entered Prague and 
Soviet authorities resumed show trials, few intellectuals in the 
capitalist West could speak of Soviet Marxism without acute 
resentment or at least tacit embarrassment. 
In Mills's words, ". . . marxism-leninism has become an offi- 
cial rhetoric with which the authority of a one-party state has 
been defended, its expedient brutalities obscured, its 
achievements proclaimed."1 Any attempt to revive the Marxist 
creed under these circumstances must have entailed a denun- 
ciation of what has come to pass for Marxism in the Soviet 
Union. Not surprisingly, the Marxist renaissance in the West 
was marked by the virtually unanimous rejection of Soviet 
Marxism. 
The neo-Marxist movement in the West is no monolith. It is 
supported by social scientists of various denominations who 
may refer to themselves as radical, humanist, or critical 
sociologists. What draws them together is: (1) a Marxist-activist 
image of sociology as a practical enterprise and an explicit 
commitment o rational remodeling of society and human 
1 C. W. Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 22. 
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emancipation; (2) readiness to move beyond Marx and to 
dispense with those of his propositions that failed the histori- 
cal test; and (3) a critical attitude toward "official Marxism" as 
practiced by Soviet-style communists. 
Only a decade ago, the prospects for the academic legitima- 
tion of Marxism seemed negligible to its proponents. Among 
others, Ehrlich, Colfax, Horton, and Nicolaus cited various 
political and organizational obstacles hampering the conver- 
sion of Marxism into an academic endeavor.2 Despite the 
gloomy forecasts, Marxist sociology did not go underground. 
In the 'seventies, the academic legitimation of Marxism in the 
United States proceeded at an accelerated pace: Marxist 
sociology departments appeared in the universities; radical 
and humanist sociologists consolidated their efforts organ- 
izationally; a Marxist section was established under the aus- 
pices of the ASA; dissertations fostering Marxist tradition 
were successfully defended; some thirty journals devoted to 
the Marxist cause were available to scholars in the United 
States by the end of the 1970s. 
Prejudices against Marxist scholars still run high in the 
United States. Some incidents where Marxists are reported to 
be treated unfairly are genuine cases of discrimination. How- 
ever, the very nature of complaints about hiring practices, 
promotional hazards, tenure and salary considerations 
sounded by Marxist scholars suggest that they move in the 
mainstream of academic life. Many of these complaints can be 
heard from scholars working in other, newly established, 
nonmainstream sociological traditions. Reviewing the recent 
progress of neo-Marxist sociology in the United States, Flacks 
and Türkei reported "the growing acceptance of Marxism 
within the discipline and as a feature of graduate training" 
and expressed a cautious optimism that this trend is becoming 
irreversible.3 
2 In J. D. Colfax and J. L. Roach, eds., Radical Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 
1971). J R. Flacks and G. Türkei, "Radical Sociology: The Emergence of Neo-Marxian 
Perspectives in U.S. Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 193-238, at p. 
234. 
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It is hard to avoid a sense of irony as one follows the 
progress of Marxist sociology in the West. Despite the Marx- 
ists' claim to the contrary, academic bourgeois sociology 
managed to accommodate Marxism within its confines. Marx- 
ist sociologists can now enjoy the fruits of academic freedom. 
They occupy better positions and have greater resources in 
their fight with academic bourgeois sociology than ever be- 
fore. Are they ready to go on until their paradigm is 
recognized as the only humane and rational way of doing 
sociology? 
Most sociologists would discard such a possibility. Skeptics 
may even argue that the Marxist revival is actually a degener- 
ation of Marxism or the newest trick designed by the old foes 
to emasculate Marxism under the guise of its academic legiti- 
mation. The last argument, favored by Soviet Marxists, has a 
strong functionalist flavor. Whatever truth one is ready to 
accord to this interpretation, it cannot answer many important 
questions posed by the ascent of academic Marxism in the 
West. 
Flacks and Türkei, in their comprehensive review of neo- 
Marxist sociology in the United States, repeatedly use the 
expressions "a definite Marxist paradigm," "the neo-Marxist 
paradigm," "the original Marxist paradigm."4 The authors do 
not make a direct reference to Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. But the parallel between their usage and Kuhn's 
theory of scientific paradigms is not accidental. One wonders 
how far Flacks and Türkei are ready to go in their (re)vision 
of Marxist sociology as a set of exemplary studies and unques- 
tioned presuppositions which provide a paradigm for normal 
science that keeps functioning "as long as the paradigm itself 
is taken for granted."5 Should we interpret the above state- 
ments to the effect that the present-day Marxists accept 
paradigm pluralism as a sound policy for sociological research 
4 Ibid. 
5 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970), p. 145. 
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and thereby acknowledge a scientific value for non-Marxist 
sociologies? 
The question is not only rhetoric. For Marx apparently saw 
his theory as the one and only paradigm for doing authentic 
social science, incompatible with bourgeois sociology. The 
question is also far from academic. For in the countries where 
Marxism emerged as a dominant sociological paradigm, 
non- Marxist sociologies and sociologists all but disappeared. 
Here we come to the central issue of this paper. The ques- 
tion with which this paper is concerned is: "Is the Marxist 
paradigm compatible with academic freedom?" 
I propose the following plan for the discussion. First, I will 
review the state of academic freedom in one communist 
state - the Soviet Union. Then I will try to show how practical 
experience gained by communist countries feeds back to the 
Marxist paradigm. Next, I will attempt to show that Soviet 
experience has some relevance to academic Marxism in the 
West. And finally, I will share some thoughts about the con- 
troversy over value-partisanship and value-neutrality as strate- 
gies for sociological research. 
I have some first-hand experience of doing sociology in the 
Soviet Union.6 Yet my knowledge as an "eyewitness" is inevi- 
tably of limited value and should be treated critically. I did not 
poll Soviet sociologists' opinion about the state of academic 
freedom in the Soviet Union. My account need not be shared 
either by my Soviet or by my Western colleagues. I hope, 
however, that this analysis will help to stimulate a much- 
needed discussion involving each side. To the extent that this 
objective is met, I would consider this endeavor useful. 
The Ethos of Ideology 
Academic freedom is commonly understood in the West as 
"the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher 
6 I received my doctoral (Kandidat Nauk) degree from the USSR Academy of 
Science Institute of Sociological Research and worked in this Institute on several 
research projects until I emigrated to the United States in 1976. 
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institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems 
of his science and to express his conclusions . . . without inter- 
ference from political and ecclesiastical authority . . . ."7 Marx- 
ists view this definition as ideological camouflage. In 
capitalist society, they argue, the scholar is bound to serve class 
interests. He is paid by academic institutions as long as he 
helps to fortify the institutions of capitalist society. In Horton's 
graphic words, the scholar "is hired to do the political job of 
apology; therein lie the limits to his academic freedom . . . ."8 
This is a negative image of academic freedom. The question 
is whether this notion has any positive meaning for a Marxist 
scholar, or if the term is meaningful for him only as a descrip- 
tion of an ideological distortion of reality under capitalism. 
Put differently, does it make sense to speak of academic free- 
dom in communist society? 
Soviet Marxists apparently give a negative answer to this 
question. The very category of academic freedom is absent 
from the official Soviet vocabulary. The recently published 
edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia does not have an entry 
under this heading. Neither does the previous edition, pub- 
lished in 1949. The first and the last time academic freedom 
was spelled out by an authoritative Soviet source was in 1927, 
when the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia informed 
its reader that the term signifies "freedom of learning and 
teaching (autonomy) guaranteed by the statutes of the Higher 
Learning Institutions" and refers specifically to "the privileges 
which were granted to the universities in the West."9 Given the 
absence of a direct reference to academic freedom in the 
Soviet Union and the failure to specify its meaning in the later 
publications, one can assume that the category is a misnomer, 
insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned. Much of what we 
know about Marxist social science supports this impression. 
7 A. O. Lovejoy, "Academic Freedom," in Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 1:384-388. at n. 384 8 J. Horton, "The Fetishism of Sociology," in Colfax and Roach, Radical Sociology, p.182. 
9 The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsik- 
lopedia, 1972), p. 769. 
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The social scientist is seen in Soviet society as a partisan 
scholar who willingly binds himself to the working class and 
caters to its interests as stipulated by the Communist Party. 
Technically, he is free to pursue his scholarly interests, to 
discuss and criticize the established ideas. Even Stalin en- 
couraged creativity and independence in scientific work. The 
famous Short Course of the Soviet Communist Party, written 
under Stalin's personal supervision, insisted that "Marxist- 
Leninist theory cannot be seen as a sum total of dogmas, as a 
catechism, as a creed, and Marxists themselves as pedants and 
dogmatists .... As a science, it cannot stand and does not stand 
in one place - it is constantly developed and perfected."10 The 
principle of "criticism and self-criticism" was advocated in Stal- 
in's time as a guarantee for the freedom of scientific work. In 
practice, it was instrumental in suppressing any vestiges of 
academic freedom in the country. Venturing beyond the for- 
mulas offered by the official organ of Soviet Marxism, the 
journal Problems of Philosophy, entailed a grave personal risk. 
Cautious and defensive as it is, the testimony of the official 
Soviet press shed some light on the state of academic freedom 
under Stalin's rule: 
During the VASKhNIL (1948) Meeting, throughout the discus- 
sion of the problems of linguistics (1950), at the Pavlov Congress 
(1950) some correct judgements were often dismissed "off 
hand," certain mistakes magnified and overemphasized. Many 
scientists were denied the possibility to report and to argue their 
views and conclusions. . . In this situation the temptation often 
built up to resort to the authority of one's official position as a 
final argument. ... In the atmosphere of distrust and prejudice, 
labels were sometimes attached to scholars who were "excom- 
municated" from Marxism, whereas unprincipled isavowal of 
one's views and conspicuous "repentance" were sometimes pre- 
sented as a positive example of self-criticism and of ideological 
maturity.11 
10 Istoriici VKPB. Kratkii Kurs (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1954), p. 339. 11 "Razvivat Leninskii Stil v Filosofshikh Issledovaniiakh," Voprosy Filosofa 4 
(1965): 3-8, at p. 6. 
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I set aside the generally non- Marxist explanation prof erred by 
this editorial that links the plight of a social institution - Soviet 
science - to the lack of morals among scientists and to Stalin's 
personality response traits. I wish to bring attention to the 
heavy burden of daily face-work that the Soviet scholar must 
have endured in his professional activities. The editorial only 
alludes to this phenomenon. Its destructive potential and per- 
vasiveness, its role as an indicator of academic freedom in the 
country, deserve much closer attention. 
To retain his position in academia, a Soviet scholar had to 
do an enormous amount of face-work. He had to project an 
image of a person totally committed to the Marxist cause. 
Moreover, he had to be ready to denounce his past selves and 
to disavow his stated views as immature, mistaken, non- 
Marxist, and, in an extreme case, as anti-Marxist. The speed 
and skillfulness with which he could perform his role were 
important ingredients in the scholar's academic career, if not 
in his physical well-being. 
If this picture of science as a social institution is reminiscent 
of what Goffman called "total institutions,"12 it is because 
Soviet science in Stalin's time (and Soviet society as a whole) 
approximated a total institution. Few scientists could withstand 
the pressure when the authority of a scientific community was 
mobilized against their "mistaken" views. The scholar was 
forced to make an uneasy choice between the roles of hypo- 
crite and true believer or face moral and physical harassments. 
Looking back, we can find no traces of academic freedom in 
the partisan Soviet science of those years, except in the narrow 
sense in which Horton defined the term as freedom "to do the 
political job of apology." 
The situation changed after Stalin's death. The de- 
Stalinization campaign was launched in 1956. It brought 
new hopes to many Marxists. The notion of academic freedom 
was not rehabilitated, unlike other concepts such as "sociol- 
12 E. Goffman, Asylums (New York: Anchor, 1961). 
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ogy," "quantification," or "verification." But the new spirit in 
academia was unmistakable. The break with the past was un- 
derscored in the numerous publications that condemned past 
abuses and proclaimed that "... the Party first of all opposes 
every effort o impose any one standpoint as the only correct 
one and denounces rule by decree and incompetent inter- 
ference in theoretical debates."13 
The policy statements i sued in post-Stalin Russia suggested 
a definite shift toward "the ethos of science."14 The norm of 
"communism" was underscored by the recognition that "the 
Marxist partisan approach to the contest of ideas in science 
entails . . . dialogue without which serious contacts are incon- 
ceivable"15 and was endorsed by the call to strengthen ties with 
foreign scientists, to expand "personal contacts and corre- 
spondence" which "make for an atmosphere of trust and 
friendship between scientists."16 "Universalism" was fortified 
by the rejection of "the rule by decree."17 Criticism of "incom- 
petent interference in theoretical debates"18 and denunciation 
of the "monopoly" established by certain schools in Soviet 
science19 reinforced the norm of "disinterestedness" and "or- 
ganized skepticism." 
Perhaps even more indicative of the improved climate for 
scientific work were the enhanced quality and the critical 
overtone of sociological research. During the 'sixties, Soviet 
sociologists conducted numerous studies that shed new light 
13 "Za Razvitie i Ukreplenie Sviazei Mezhdu Filosofami Raznykh Stran," Voprosy 
Filosofii 2 (1958): 3-8, at p. 8. 
14 R. K. Merton, "Science and the Social Order," in N. W. Storer, ed., The Sociology 
of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 254-266. 15 A. M. Rumiantsev, "Gumanisticheskaia Ideologiia i Sotsialnye Nauki," Voprosy 
Filosofii 11 (1968): 3-13, at p. 12. 
16 "Za Razvitie i Ukreplenie Sviazei Mezhdu Filosofami Raznykh Stran," p. 8. 
17 "Razvivat Leninskii Stil v Filosofshikh Issledovaniiakh," p. 6. 
18 Ibid. 
19 N. P. Dubinin, "I. V. Michurin i Sovremennaia Genetica," Voprosy Filosofii 6 
(1966): 59-70: V. P. Efroimson and N. M. Iuditskaia, "Nauchnaia Kompetentnost - 
Nepremennoe Uslovie Filosofskogo Issledovaniia," Voprosy Filosofii 2 (1966): 62-165; 
A. F. Shishkin, "Ob Etike Uchenogo," Voprosy Filosofii 2 (1966): 14-25. 
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on the social structure, mobility, consumption patterns, and 
public opinion in the country.20 
Soviet researchers generally avoided sweeping conclusions 
and generalizations that could compromise the validity of 
Marx's theory. But the critical thrust of their findings could 
not be concealed. It would be unthinkable in the previous 
years, for example, to confront a Soviet audience with 
sociological data indicating that "various social groups in our 
society are not yet equal in their education, in their material 
status and have unequal opportunity for obtaining a middle- 
level education, for consuming cultural goods, for organizing 
their daily life."21 It must have come as a revelation to many 
Soviet readers that the intelligentsia in Soviet society may be 
self-perpetuating as a class, that the workers in a socialist state 
may be alienated, or that various segments of the Soviet 
population may be critical of existing institutions. 
The new developments in Soviet sociology posed an in- 
teresting problem for the sociology of science. Empirical 
findings gathered by Soviet sociologists during the 'sixties in- 
dicated that there are anomalies in Soviet society that did not 
accord well with certain propositions and predictions derived 
from Marx's theory. As these anomalies gradually accumu- 
lated, Soviet Marxists were confronted with the dilemma: 
either to modify the Marxist paradigm so that it could explain 
anomalous events or to look for a better conceptual frame- 
work. 
20 Some of these studies are reviewed in S. M. Upset, "Commentary: Social Stratifi- 
cation Research and Soviet Scholarship," in M. Yanovich and W. A. Fisher, eds., Social 
Stratification and Mobility in the USSR (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and 
Science Press, 1973), pp. 355-391; R. B. Dobson, "Mobility and Stratification i the 
Soviet Union." Annual Review of Sociology 3 (1977): 297-330; D. N. Shalin, "The 
Development of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976," Annual Review of Sociology 4 
(1978): 171-191; D. N. Shalin, "Between the Ethos of Science and the Ethos of 
Ideology," Sociological Focus 12 (1979): 275-293; I. Zemtsov, IKSI: The Moscow Institute 
of Applied Research. A Note on the Development of Sociology in the USSR, Soviet Institutions 
Series No. 6 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1976). 21 B. Rubin and Iu. Kolesnikov, Student Glazami Sotsiologa (Rostov: Izdatelstvo Ros- 
tovskogo Universiteta, 1968), p. 33. 
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The situation would not pose an insurmountable problem 
for an academic bourgeois sociologist, particularly in the age 
of paradigms. The manifest function of academic freedom is 
to insure that the scientist can follow either path. Not so in the 
case of a Marxist sociologist. He renounces the institution of 
academic freedom because he believes that its latent function 
is to insure that any paradigm shift would not jeopardize the 
existing order. He also refuses, as a matter of principle, to 
separate his role as a scientist (that forces him to be a re- 
visionist) from his role as an ideologist (that urges him to fight 
revisionism). As a result, he is left with no choice but to stretch 
out his paradigm to the utmost limit and to suppress the 
findings that do not fit his grand theory. The dramatic events 
that have shaken Soviet sociology in this decade can be seen as 
an unanticipated consequence of the Marxist radical attempt 
to merge the ethos of science and the ethos of ideology. 
I will not recount the course of the campaign for the pro- 
motion of the class-bound, partisan approach in Soviet sociol- 
ogy.22 The point I want to make here is that the Marxist 
picture of academic freedom as "but an ephemera fostered by 
the elites which run their institutions"23 and academic 
bourgeois sociology as "the enterprise commonly known as the 
oldest profession"24 very aptly describes the current situation 
in Soviet sociology. The remarkable difference between Soviet 
and Western sociologists is that the former make no bones of 
their serving a partisan cause, the state Party. They readily 
admit that "sociology in the USSR is an active weapon in the 
22 The details of this campaign can be found in D. N. Shalin, "On Current Trends 
in Soviet Sociology," La Critica Sociologica 38 (1976): 173-184; Shalin, "The Develop- 
ment of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976"; Shalin, "Between the Ethos of Science and the 
Ethos of Ideology"; A. Simirenko, "Soviet and American Sociology in the Seventies," 
Studies in Comparative Communism 6 (Spring/Summer 1973): 25-50; Zemtsov, IDSI: The 
Moscow Institute of Applied Research. 
23 J. D. Colfax and J. L. Roach, "Introduction" in Colfax and Roach, Radical 
Sociology, PP. 3-21, at p. 7. 
24 M. Nicolaus, "Why Sociologists?," in Colfax and Roach, Radical Sociology, pp. 
45-59, at p. 46. 
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hands of the Communist Party."25 "Marxist sociology clearly 
and unambiguously, without any hesitation, takes the side of 
the working class, of its Party. ... It does not hide this fact. It 
is proud of it. . . ."26 A proponent of this position is not likely 
to be embarrassed by the following disclosure: "The Central 
Committee of the CPSU put the task [before Soviet 
sociologists] to develop 'historical materialism as the general 
sociological theory.' "27 
Having taken this stand, Soviet Marxists are facing a delicate 
question: How to handle those sociologists whose views are at 
variance with the established paradigm? The answer to this 
question was made clear during the ideological purges that 
Soviet sociologists underwent in this decade. Unorthodox 
scholars were condemned by the Party for "drifting away from 
the positions of class analysis"28 - read: for deviating from the 
Marxist paradigm. Some of the earlier published books, con- 
taining unconventional ideas, were destroyed.29 Historical 
materialism was declared the general sociological theory bind- 
ing to every Soviet sociologist. Soviet Marxists were called 
upon to "maintain the purity of Marxism-Leninism, of the 
class-bound, partisan approach in the social sciences."30 And 
Marxism was once again ossified into a "truth that must be 
believed and enacted against all the evidence to the con- 
trary."31 
25 G. V. Osipov, Teoriia i Praktika Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovanii v SSSR (Moskva: 
Nauka, 1979), p. 261. 
26 G. P. Davidiiuk, Vvedenie v Prikladnuiu Sotsiologiiu (Minsk: Vysshaia Shkola, 1975), 
p. 27. 
27 Osipov, Teoriia i Praktika, p. 172. The inside quotation is from KPSS v Rezoliut- 
siiakh i Resheniiakh Sezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov, torn 9 (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1972), 
p. 348. To appreciate the absurdity of trîiif statement, he Western reader is advised to 
replace "The Central Committee of the CPSU" by "the State Department" in the 
above quotation, and "historical materialism" by "structural functionalism." 28 G. E. Glezerman, "Istoricheskii Materialism i Problemy Sotsialnykh Issledovanii," 
Kommunist 4 (1979): 76-87, at p. 84. 29 B. Rabbot, "A Letter to Brezhnev," The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 6, 1977; 
Shalin, "The Development of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976." 30 S. T. Trapeznikov, "Marksistko-Leninskaia Filosofskaia Nauka i Sovremennost," 
Voprosy Filosofa 8 (1973): 16-30, at p. 28. 31 H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1958), p. 89. 
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It is arguable how far the new trends in Soviet sociology 
might have led had they not been blocked by the Party. But 
one thing is painfully clear: most of the gains in the domain of 
academic freedom made by Soviet social scientists were lost in 
the 'seventies. The shift back from the ethos of science to what 
I have called "the ethos of ideology"32 is omnipresent. The 
times are gone when the editorials were renouncing as "unac- 
ceptable the replacement of substantive arguments in polemics 
by political and ideological arguments."33 Instead, we hear the 
familiar precept that "partisanship in Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy coincides with the search for scientific truth"34 and 
an open call to revive the principle of "criticism and self- 
criticism."35 
Those sociologists who still insist that the spirit of partisan- 
ship and bourgeois academic freedom are two names standing 
for one thing should examine more closely the experience of 
their colleagues in communist societies.36 
Marxist Academics in the West 
So much for academic freedom in a Marxist state - the 
Soviet Union. But is it a Marxist state, one can ask. Does Soviet 
experience have any value for the testing and developing of 
Marx's theory? These questions must particularly interest 
neo- Marxists in the West. For the credibility of Marxism with a 
32 The ethos of ideology is an ideal-typical construct that is designed to complement 
Merton's concept of the ethos of science. I consider both concepts as comprising an 
ideal continuum for describing practical scientific enterprise. The concept of the ethos 
of ideology contrasts to the norms of universalism, disinterestedness, communism, 
and organized skepticism the values of imperialism, partisanship, privatism, and 
organized ostracism. For details, see Shalin, "Between the Ethos of Science and the 
Ethos of Ideology." 
33 "Razvivat Leninskii Stil v Filosofshikh Issledovaniiakh," p. 6. 
34 "S Pozitsii Partiinosti," Voprosy Filosofii 1 (1974): 47-56, at p. 47. 
35 Ibid., p. 55. 
36 The confrontation between Marxist ideology and Marxist sociology in Poland is 
documented by Z. Walaszek, "Recent Developments in Polish Sociology," Annual 
Review of Sociology 3 (1977): 331-362, and in Yugoslavia by S. Deutsch, "Sociological 
Currents in Contemporary Yugoslavaia," The American Sociologist 12 (1977): 141-147. 
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human face largely depends on "whether Stalinism follows 
from Marxism itself or whether it was simply a contingent 
aberration peculiar to Russian culture."37 The problem as- 
sumes a new dimension with the rise of academic Marxism. 
Having raised the claim that Marxism is a scientific paradigm, 
Marxists may be expected to specify what they are prepared to 
count as evidence against their conceptual framework. 
Marx and Engels did not hesitate to make empirical state- 
ments about the course of historical events. Drawing on their 
theory, they made several theoretical predictions as to where 
and when the proletarian revolution was to begin. Their fore- 
casts failed to materialize. And when it became clear that the 
proletariat in developed capitalist countries would not behave 
in accordance with theoretical expectations, Marx and Engels 
turned their attention to the revolutionary process in the East. 
In October 1917, the Revolution struck czarist Russia. The 
Bolshevik faction of Russian Marxists took power and de- 
clared Russia the first socialist state. From the standpoint of 
Marxism as a political ideology, that was a significant achieve- 
ment. From the standpoint of Marxism as a scientific 
paradigm, that was a disaster. The odds against recognizing 
the Soviet state as a Marxist society were overwhelming: the 
proletarian revolution took place in a country where the pro- 
letariat made up less than 3 percent of the population; the 
revolution occurred in a predominantly peasant country that 
was economically and culturally one of the most backward in 
the capitalist world system; the revolution happened in one 
country in spite of Marx's warning, issued specifically in re- 
sponse to the question posed to him by Russian revo- 
lutionaries, that this was theoretically inconceivable; the revo- 
lution was disavowed by major Marxist theoreticians in the 
West. 
Bolsheviks brushed aside all these questions as irrelevant. 
They charged Western Marxists with theoretical timidity, 
37 A. W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism" Telos 5 
(1978): 5-48, at p. 7. 
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dogmatism, and revisionism, and at the same time they 
praised their own reading of Marx as a model for a creative 
development of scientific theory in the face of unique histori- 
cal circumstances. They staunchly insisted and are still con- 
vinced that theirs is the only authentic Marxist science. I sus- 
pect that theirs is neither Marxist nor science. 
I challenge Soviet theoreticians to explain why, in their 
allegedly Marxist state, they consistently refuse to publish 
some of Marx's works, most notably the collection of Marx's 
essays Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, Under- 
standably, it would be awkward to publish the following query 
that Marx raised about the Russian state: "How did this 
power, or this phantom of a power, contrive to assume such 
dimensions as to rouse on the one side the passionate asser- 
tion, and on the other the angry denial of its threatening the 
world with a rehearsal of Universal Monarchy?"38 In the era 
of detente and SALT, such a testimony is clearly subversive 
(one could easily get jailed for it in present-day Russia). But if 
Soviet Marxists find Marx's extensive analysis of Russia and of 
its political future unduly polemic and unscientific, they must 
have the courage to state this openly and let every Soviet 
Marxist judge the matter for himself. As long as they decline 
to do this, their Marxism is truncated, at best. 
Unlike some works written by Marx, Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions has been published in Russian. Soviet ex- 
perts' attitude toward Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigm is 
mixed. But the very fact of the translation suggests that they 
are ready to grant it some relevance. If so, they must have 
noticed the following thesis, central to Kuhn's argument: "The 
very existence of science depends upon vesting the power to 
choose between paradigms in members of a special kind of 
community."39 Kuhn clearly means here "scientific ommu- 
nity." Soviet authorities understood the message correctly, in- 
38 K. Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1899), pp. 
74-75. 
39 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 167. 
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sofar as the natural sciences are concerned. The ideological 
authorities no longer dare to issue instructions to biologists on 
how to respond to corpuscular genetics. Yet that is exactly 
what is happening in the Soviet social sciences, where the 
Central Committee of the CPSU instructs Soviet sociologists 
what they should adopt as a general sociological theory. If 
every social scientist is judged to be an ideologist, every 
ideologist is entitled to make judgments about scientific mat- 
ters. As long as the division of labor between Marxist sociology 
and Marxist ideology is not institutionalized, the Soviet 
sociologist will remain "a scientific ideologist," a craftsman 
whose trade is to expertly manufacture false consciousness. 
The failure of East European countries to live up to Marx's 
expectations does not discourage Marxists in the West. They 
persuasively argue that the mistakes committed in communist 
societies need not be attributed exclusively to Marx's theory. 
Granted this, Western Marxists still have to face up to the 
spectacular fiasco of Marx's predictions about Western 
capitalism. 
Neo- Marxist sociologists readily admit that some of the 
Marxist propositions can now be certified as wrong. Says 
Mills: "Marx is often wrong. . . . After all, obsolescence is part 
of history; as such it is part of Marxism."40 Flacks and Türkei 
mention several major points where Marx's theory requires a 
thorough revision.41 Among them are the deterministic vision 
of the relationship between material being, class consciousness, 
and class action; the simplistic account of the state as a ruling 
class's executive committee; the idealized perception of the 
working class; the underestimation of the role played by in- 
tellectuals in the revolutionary movement. In the face of these 
revisions, one is tempted to ask how many cornerstones must 
be taken from the foundation of Marxism before the whole 
building is to collapse? 
To quote again Flacks and Türkei, "departures from Marx's 
40 Mills, The Marxists, p. 37. 41 Flacks and Türkei, "Radical Sociology." 
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expectations are to be viewed not simply as refutations of a 
theory but as occasions for deepening understanding of the 
dynamics of contemporary society."42 This statement would 
probably do more than raise the brow of a Popperian fal- 
sificationist. For it sounds like an invitation to multiply auxil- 
iary hypotheses. A sophisticated falsificationism, such as advo- 
cated by Lakatos,43 may be more tolerant to theoretical ad- 
justments. But it would demand an unambiguous answer to 
the question of whether a given paradigm shift is progressive 
or degenerative.44 
The logic of Kuhn's and, even more to the point, of 
Feyerabend's argument may come to the rescue of the Marxist 
paradigm. Following this logic, Marxists could argue that 
whether or not a paradigm shift is degenerative or progressive 
can be determined only retrospectively; that a judgment of 
this matter is itself paradigm-bound; and that none of the 
currently operating sociological paradigms could claim serious 
in vivo predictive power. 
It is not my objective here to evaluate the validity of the 
Marxist paradigm or to discuss the merits of competing 
philosophies of science. My point is that Marxist academics in 
the West find themselves progressively involved in the lan- 
guage game played by their bourgeois colleagues. They de- 
mand the same privileges for themselves, compete for the 
same scarce resources, and expect their works to be judged by 
the same standards of excellence as do members of other 
scientific paradigms. Given all the revisions already accepted 
by neo- Marxists, is it too much to expect that they take one 
more step, acknowledging that academic freedom is more 
42 Ibid., p. 209. 
43 1. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Pro- 
grammes," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196. 
44 This question is very much to the point in the case of Soviet Marxism. The 
"vestiges of the past" theory aimed to explain the failures of a socialist society and the 
thesis of "insufficient utilization of the advantages of the socialist system" are 
paradigmatic cases of a degenerative paradigm shift. 
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than an ideological fiction and that academic bourgeois sociol- 
ogy does more than a job of political apology? 
To some Marxists this question must appear unduly rhetori- 
cal. It does not do justice to a great diversity among neo- 
Marxists in the West. Indeed, Mills and Birnbaum, Althusser 
and Gouldner, Colfax and Bottomore are all associated with 
Marxist tradition, but things that draw them apart are more 
salient than those drawing them together. While some neo- 
Marxists denounce academic freedom as a trick, others take it 
for granted. Yet that is exactly what one should not do. One 
cannot take for granted one's freedom to conduct social in- 
quiry without accepting the obligation to protect the oppo- 
nent's right to pursue his research and acknowledging scientific 
value for alternative ways of doing sociology. 
The idea of a dialogue between Marxist and non-Marxist 
scholars is still anathema to orthodox Marxism. But the recent 
advances of Marxism in the West suggest that academic and 
Marxist sociologies can peacefully co-exist. To the extent that 
neo-Marxists are willing to fortify the established trend, Marx- 
ism becomes one of the paradigms in the contemporary 
sociological community. In my view, the academization of 
Marxism does not mean, as Gouldner's thesis about academic 
legitimation of sociology implies,45 that Marxists are surren- 
dering their right to criticize and remodel the existing institu- 
tions. What it implies is that Marxists accede to working beside 
and, whenever possible, together with non-Marxist humanists 
and critics of the present order without giving up their special 
commitment to human emancipation or denying their oppo- 
nents the right to argue their cause. 
To be sure, this is a difficult step. To take it means to 
dispense with the monopoly on critical and humanist insight 
into the institutions of the establishment claimed by Marxist 
scholars. The most unsettling thing for a Marxist in this option 
is that it threatens to erode his identity. Like most of us, he 
45 A. W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 
1970). 
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longs for a clear-cut identity, for a distinct cause that would set 
up a sharp boundary between "them" and "us." And as most 
humans, he can experience anxiety when he finds the bound- 
ary blurred. But if he takes into account that social boundaries 
are man-made and man-sustained abstractions, that no 
boundaries can hedge off social particulars of one denomina- 
tion from those in the next taxon, the Marxist scholar may 
find it easier to face up to the erosion of his theoretical 
identity. After all, identity crisis is germane to living beings as 
long as they keep growing, and, if anything, it signifies matur- 
ity. 
I am fully aware that the peaceful co-existence of Marxist 
and bourgeois sociologies can be viewed in a quite different 
perspective. An alternative scenario would picture academiza- 
tion of Marxism as a means to augment the resources in the 
Marxist struggle with bourgeois sociology and capitalist soci- 
ety. This tactic was advocated by Lenin and is popular among 
modern communists. They do not miss the opportunity to 
publicize their views through The New York Times, to lecture an 
American public about the state of human rights in the Soviet 
Union, or to invoke the Freedom of Information Act in order 
to receive needed information from the State Department. All 
this does not oblige them to reciprocate or to stop denouncing 
the lack of freedom in the West. 
I do not know how many neo-Marxists favor this scenario. 
Some of them are definitely moving in this direction. When I 
read about Marxist scholars "jamming" their bourgeois coun- 
terparts in the conference hall and subjecting them to public 
ostracism,46 I am vividly reminded of the militant scientific 
partisanship in the Soviet Union. When I hear about a Marxist 
sociology department that bars non- Marxist sociologists from 
its rank, I cannot help remembering my Soviet colleagues 
46 W. A. Gamson, "Sociology's Children of Affluence," in Colfax and Roach, Radical 
Sociology, pp. 450-459; P. M. Hauser, "On Actionism in the Craft of Sociology," ibid. ,
pp. 425-439; R. H. Robins, "Up Against the Statler-Hilton Wall: Politics in the 
Scholarly Associations," ibid. , pp. 440-449. 
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censured for adopting improper views. No, I am not trying to 
establish "guilt by association." The point I am trying to make 
is this: critics of academic sociology and of bourgeois society 
can pursue their criticism and thereby contribute to human 
emancipation as long as they are protected by, and are able to 
protect, the bourgeois institution of academic freedom. This is 
one of the most important lessons that Western Marxists can 
learn from the experience of their East European colleagues. 
Value-Neutrality and Value-Partisanship 
Weber once noticed that the honesty of a contemporary 
scholar can be judged by his attitude toward Marx. I take it to 
mean that the scholar must not let his ideological and substan- 
tive differences with Marx blind him to the intellectual hori- 
zons opened by Marx. A man of rare sociological imagination, 
Marx brought to life powerful conceptual frames which sur- 
vived long after his general conceptual framework shared the 
fate of the Hegelian system. The latter fact should not be a 
cause for distress: as the founding fathers of Marxism liked to 
stress, "system" is the most conservative part of a scholar's 
intellectual contribution. 
As happened with Hegel's grand system, Marx's theoretical 
edifice was taken apart by his disciples. Contemporary Marx- 
ists often disagree on which reading is closer to the original 
spirit of Marxism. But there is a solid consensus among them 
that sociological research is a value-bound, partisan enterprise. 
This vision sets them apart from those who, following Weber, 
advocate value-neutrality as a strategy for social research. The 
controversy over value-partisanship and value-neutrality has 
become a standard theme of twentieth-century sociological 
discourse. What is often overlooked in this polemics is that the 
same author who rejected scientism and the idea of an 
ideologically uncommitted science prided himself upon dis- 
covering "natural laws . . . working with iron necessity to in- 
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evitable results."47 It is not also fully appreciated that Weber 
grounded social knowledge in human values, and almost in- 
variably ignored that the founder of positivism, Auguste 
Comte, was a passionate propagandist of the religion of hu- 
manity. 
It seems to me that value-neutrality and value-partisanship 
represent a perfect dialectical contradiction, a thesis and anti- 
thesis requiring a theoretical and practical synthesis. An at- 
tempt to radically separate them or to subordinate one to the 
other is self-defeating. An encounter of value and truth, of 
pure and practical reason, is a major stimulus to sociological 
research. Their creative tension can be sustained only if there 
is enough room for conflict between the individual's role as a 
scientist and his role as an ideologist. 
Elsewhere, I have hinted that it might be possible to com- 
bine value-neutrality and value-partisanship in a third ap- 
proach which I tentatively called value-tolerance.48 The 
value-tolerant orientation is predicated upon the special role 
played .by a scholar in contemporary society. Mannheim 
sensed very acutely this special position of a scholar- 
intellectual.49 Yet I would argue that the intellectual's position 
is peculiar not because he is chronically unattached, as Mann- 
heim believed, but because he can attach himself to several 
causes simultaneously.50 He develops to the utmost limit the 
social mechanism of intelligence51 by taking the value per- 
47 K. Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 8. 
48 Shalin, "Between the Ethos of Science and the Ethos of Ideology." The theoreti- 
cal and methodological rationale for the following ideas is given in D. N. Shalin, "The 
Genesis of Social Interactionism and Differentiation of Macro- and Microsociological 
Paradigms," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 6 (Fall/Winter 1978): 3-38, and "On 
Things Themselves and the Art of Their Accounting; Or How We Go About Assign- 
ing Individuals to a Class and Ascribing a Class to Individuals," unpublished manu- 
script, 1979. 
49 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936). 
50 The macrostructuralist can reasonably argue that the development of the mech- 
anism of taking the role of the other in the twentieth century has been facilitated by 
the structural changes in society. 
81 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University ot Chicago Press, 1934). 
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spective of the other. Drawing on different paradigms for 
making sense of reality, the social scientist can bridge the gap 
between conflicting and incommensurable universes of dis- 
course. Tolerance to multiple realities, simultaneous member- 
ship in different paradigms, and relative independence of any 
particular reference frame - these features of scientific work 
in academic institutions are central to value-tolerant science. 
As a politician, the individual can declare: "Here I stand; I 
can do no other."52 He can lend his face to dramatizing any 
particular cause and use it as a single source of his identity. As 
a scholar, the individual is doomed to be alienated, is bound to 
oscillate between alternative frameworks, and is deprived of 
the right to take refuge in a "real me." He must be ready to act 
as a devil's advocate or, if you will, to take the role of "the 
devious other." 
The principle of value-tolerance suggests a new perspective 
on academic freedom. The latter can be conceptualized as the 
freedom of self-alienation, or to put it in the language of 
Goffman's dramaturgical analysis,53 as the freedom of face- 
work. The scholar must be free to dramatize any cause and 
dispense with any contingent self-indentity pressed upon him 
by a class. Academic freedom is the freedom to alienate oneself rom 
the inherited class commitments and official self -identities. Looked at 
in this perspective, academic freedom is not so much a license 
as a yoke that the scholar imposes upon himself. He is always 
tempted to evade his responsibility, to escape into the clearly 
defined, unambiguous "authentic self." But the authenticity 
afforded by a given partisan cause is an unreflexive mode of 
being in the world-taken-for-granted, and as such it is an- 
tithetical to freedom. 
The "authentic" social research that Horton contrasted to 
52 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by G. H. H. Gerth and C. 
W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 127. 53 E. Goffman, "On Face- Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interac- 
tion," Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes 18 (1955): 213-231, and 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor, 1959). 
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the "alienated" sociological labor in a capitalist society is fully 
realizable in a totalitarian society.54 The totalitarian state es- 
tablishes a monopoly on the individual's face-work, turning it 
into face-labor. It forces the individual to dramatize an official 
reality as objective and meaningful and persecutes public dis- 
play of alienation as a federal crime. A social scientist in such a 
state has no choice but to lend his face to the Party-controlled 
production of ideological surplus meaning or quit sociology as 
a vocation (if he can) and leave the country altogether (if he 
can). A modern communist state confronts the scholar with 
such a choice. 
Capitalism may be an evil but, compared to any known 
society claiming Marx's legacy, it is a mild one. Bourgeois 
academic freedom is preferable to proletarian scientific par- 
tisanship because the former protects the freedom of self- 
alienation and encourages value-tolerance, whereas the latter 
suppresses them, and thus impedes the ongoing tran- 
scendence of the ossified social structures. It must be difficult 
to live in a world where one's identity spills over the clas- 
sificatory borderlines. But if we realize that, contrary to Marx's 
belief, démystification cannot be achieved once and for all, 
that dereification is not an instantaneous revolutionary 
achievement but an ongoing accomplishment - a Sisyphian 
labor - we may find the courage to shoulder the heavy burden 
of academic freedom. 
54 Horton, "The Fetishism of Sociology." 
* I wish to thank Professor Lewis A. Coser for his comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. 
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